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In the first volume of this journal, Robert Weisberg provided a useful
topology of the "law/literature" world.' As he describes it, two kinds of
inquiries dominate the field: the first is law in literature-such as Billy
Budd,2 and the second is law as literature-such as judicial opinions as a
literary form. As is evident, Robert Ferguson's essay, "The Judicial Opin-
ion as Literary Genre,"' is an example of the second version-judicial
opinions as the objects of literary criticism.
I believe a third arena exists in which those intrigued by law/literature
can, indeed should, work. The question is that of the canon: what (and
who) is given voice; who privileged, repeated, and invoked; who silenced,
ignored, submerged, and marginalized. Law and literature have shared
traditions-of silencing, of pushing certain stories to the margin and of
privileging others. An obvious example in literature is the exclusion of
certain books from the canon of the "great books."4 In law, white men
have similarly enjoyed a place of power, speaking as if for us all, while
women and minorities have been excluded-precluded from being judges,
jurors, lawyers, and at times, even witnesses. We women might have been
the subject of the discussion, as defendants5 or as property,6 but we were
not the authors or the speakers;' we have been closed out of the hierarchy
of holding the power to write the canon.
While noting the impact of audience on the speakers of the texts that
are the subject of his analysis, Robert Ferguson seems to assume that judi-
* Copyright © 1990 Judith Resnik. My thanks to Dennis Curtis, Carolyn Heilbrun, Hannah
Lauck, Carla Kaplan, Andrea Kramer, Ayelet Waldman, and Chris Scobey.
1. Robert Weisberg, "The Law-Literature Enterprise," Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
1 (1988): 1.
2. Herman Melville, Billy Budd, ed. Barron Freeman, corrected by Elizabeth Freeman (New
York: Signet Press, 1979).
3. Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 2 (1990): 201.
4. See Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, "The Queen's Looking Glass: Female Creativity,
Male Images of Women, and the Metaphor of Literary Paternity," chapter 1 in The Madwomen in
the Attic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).
5. See, e.g., Holt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), affg 119 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1960) (despite the
functional preclusion of women from being jurors, the courts upheld the validity of a verdict against a
women accused of killing her husband).
6. See Patricia J. Williams, "On Being the Object of Property," Signs 14 (1988): 5.
7. See generally Robin West, "Economic Man and Literary Woman: One Contrast," Mercer
Law Review 39 (1988): 867.
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cial opinions are the relevant "law" to consider as "literature." Ferguson
explains that the "most creative and generally read literary form in the
law is the appellate judicial opinion ' 8 (by which he really means the
opinions of the highest appellate court in the nation, the United States
Supreme Court), and therefore he uses that form as the basis for his anal-
ysis of the "judicial voice." His argument assumes his own passivity; he is
simply the reader of the "most creative and generally read" form.
But we-that is "we" who are the commentators on (indeed the claim-
ers of the relationships between) law/literature-sit in a particular part of
the audience. We are not only readers; rather we have the opportunity to
reiterate, repeat, include or exclude certain voices in the "literary form in
the law." We are the people who contribute to what is considered the
"most generally read" legal literature. As Barbara Herrnstein Smith puts
it in her recent book, Contingencies of Value:
The recommendation of value represented by the repeated inclusion
of a particular work . . . not only promotes but goes some distance
toward creating the value of that work. . . . [FIrequent citation or
quotation by professors, scholars, critics, poets, and the other elders
of the tribe . . . all . . . have the effect of drawing the work into the
orbit of attention of potential readers and, by making the work more
likely to be experienced . . . ,they make it more likely to be exper-
ienced as "valuable." 9
What, then, are the works that "we" draw into the circle of value?
Although the law/literature enterprise is still young, it is appropriate to
look at the emerging canon of law/literature, to examine what is being
canonized and what is being left out.
II. CANONICITY
I begin this inquiry in the context of Robert Ferguson's essay, about
which I have been asked to comment. Ferguson takes as his topic "the
ways in which law provides its own peculiar kinds of statement" in the
"appellate judicial opinion."1 Robert Ferguson claims that "judges, alone
in American officialdom, explain every action with an individual writ-
ing."" He then turns to an examination of two Supreme Court opinions,
Minersville School District v. Gobitis12 and Board of Education v. Bar-
nette,' s3 to articulate the qualities of the judicial voice. From his examina-
8. Ferguson, "The Judicial Opinion," 201-2 (cited in note 3).
9. Barbara Herrnstein Smith, Contingencies of Value (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1988), 10 (emphasis in the original).
10. Ferguson, "The Judicial Opinion," 201-2 (cited in note 3).
1I. Ferguson, "The Judicial Opinion," 202 (cited in note 3). Cf note 38 and accompanying text,
infra.
12. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
13. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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tion of these Supreme Court opinions, Ferguson reaches conclusions about
the sound, conventions, and tone of "the judicial opinion."
Robert Ferguson considers the judicial writing of United States Su-
preme Court justices as genre. I am not a literary critic, but I am inter-
ested in genre, and more specifically in the kinds of questions that Annette
Kolodny raises about genre. As she explains: "[W]e read well, and with
pleasure, what we already know how to read; and what we know how to
read is to a large extent dependent upon what we have already read
(works from which we developed our expectations and our interpretative
strategies)."' 4 My concerns are that, by virtue of his methodology, Robert
Ferguson limits himself to the "already read" and thus, again in Ko-
lodny's words, leads us to engage not with "texts but paradigms."' 8
I begin with questions: Should opinions by the United States Supreme
Court be the texts that we (again, "we" law/literature commentators)
study to learn the sound, the conventions, the structure of "the judicial
voice?" When looking to understand the judicial voice in the flag salute
cases, what should one read? How is the analysis of the "judicial opinion"
affected when, for example, one reads both the Supreme Court opinion
and the record before the Supreme Court when it decided Barnette?
I am not a flag-salute case expert. The first amendment is not my area
of specialization. But I am a reader of law texts. So, when I first read
Robert Ferguson's essay, I went to look at the record in these two flag
salute cases." As a consequence, I discovered other texts that I believe
"we" (that part of the audience that gets to privilege texts by repeating
them) should include before claiming to have captured the tones to ascribe
to the judicial voice.
Recall the chronology. In Gobitis, decided by the Supreme Court in
June of 1940, the Court held 8 to 1 that school children could be forced to
salute the flag. Within less than two years, the issue was before a trial
court again. On October 6, 1942, a three judge court in the federal district
court in West Virginia decided the Barnette case at the first level." Ac-
cording to that court, three persons, "belonging to the sect known as the
'Jehovah's Witnesses'," sought injunctive relief against a state board of
education regulation requiring children in public schools to salute the
flag.' 8 Judges John J. Parker, Harry E. Watkins, and Ben Wheeler
14. Annette Kolodny, "Dancing Through the Mind Field" (1979), reprinted in The New Femi-
nist Criticism, ed. Elaine Showalter (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 144, 154. See also Nancy K.
Miller, Subject to Change (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).
15. Kolodny, "Dancing Through the Mind Field," 153 (cited in note 14).
16. Such inquiry requires no special access to archival material or lawyers' files. Rather, by virtue
of the practices of collection of many law libraries, Supreme Court "briefs and records" are readily
accessible; in the Boston area, for example, five law school libraries have such materials available on
microfiche, in bound form, and/or for more recent cases on LEXIS.
17. Barnette v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251 (S.D.W. Va. 1942).
18. 47 F. Supp. at 252.
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Moore granted the injunction. The opinion was written by Judge
Parker.19 Here are his words:
Ordinarily we would feel constrained to follow an unreversed deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of the United States, whether we agreed
with it or not. It is true that decisions are but evidences of the law
and not the law itself; but the decisions of the Supreme Court must
be accepted by the lower courts as binding upon them if any orderly
administration of justice is to be attained. The developments with
respect to the Gobitis case, however, are such that we do not feel that
it is incumbent upon us to accept it as binding authority. Of the
seven justices now members of the Supreme Court who participated
in that decision, four have given public expression [in another deci-
sion] to the view that it is unsound. . . . Under such circumstances
and believing, as we do, that the flag salute here required is violative
of religious liberty when required of persons holding the religious
views of plaintiffs, we feel that we would be recreant to our duty as
judges, if through a blind following of a decision which the Supreme
Court itself has thus impaired as an authority, we should deny pro-
tection to rights which we regard as among the most sacred of those
protected by constitutional guaranties.20
Lawyer-readers know that this opinion is pretty rare stuff. The princi-
ple argument for why the United States Supreme Court texts get their
place of privilege is that they are binding, that they are the "law" until
the Supreme Court tells us otherwise. But, in 1942, in West Virginia,
three hierarchically inferior judges said otherwise: that the law was not
what the Supreme Court had said it was less than two years before.21
According to the record before the Supreme Court as it decided the
19. Judge Parker was a judge in the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and sat in Char-
lotte, North Carolina. Judge Watkins sat in the district court for both the Southern and Northern
Districts of West Virginia; his chambers were in Fairmont, West Virginia. Judge Moore, of the
Southern District of West Virginia, sat in Charleston, West Virginia.
20. 47 F. Supp. at 252-53.
21. The career of one of those three judges, John Parker, has been the subject of much discussion.
In 1925, President Coolidge appointed Parker, a Republican, to the Fourth Circuit. In 1930, Presi-
dent Hoover nominated Judge Parker to be a justice of the United States Supreme Court; that nomi-
nation was defeated by a vote of 41-39. See generally Paul A. Freund, "Appointment of Justices:
Some Historical Notes," Harvard Law Review 101 (1988): 1146, 1154-55. A link between that event
and Parker's decision in Barnette is possible. Some political scientists argue that Parker was criticized,
in the 1930s, for his conservativism; apparently his defenders claimed that such conservativism was a
result of his role, as a lower court judge, in following precedent. See Joel B. Grossman and Stephen
Wasby, "Haynsworth and Parker: History Does Live Again," South Carolina Law Review 23
(1971): 345, 351-57. While such a comment might lead one to believe that Parker would thus have
been inclined to be less deferential to the Court than other judges, one biographer states that, "[e]xcept
for this one case [Barnette, Parker's] record clearly reflects a belief that it was the business of the
Supreme Court to overrule its own precedents." William C. Burris, Duty and the Law: Judge John J.
Parker and the Constitution (Bessemer, Ala.: Colonial Press, 1987), 203. See also 147-48. Burris
reports that Parker drafted the opinion in Barnette. Ibid., 194-95. Changes in the Court may have
been a factor in the lower court's ruling. By 1942, Robert Jackson and Wiley Rutledge had joined the
Court, and three sitting justices, Black, Douglas, and Murphy, had stated that Gobitis had been
wrongly decided. Ibid., 197-98.
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Barnette case, the lower court judges were not alone in disavowing Gobi-
tis. The amicus brief filed by the Committee on the Bill of Rights of the
American Bar Association informed the Supreme Court that, of twenty-
two "different legal publications," only two approved Gobitis." The ap-
pellees, Walter Barnette, Paul Stull, and Lucy McClure, told the Court
that other lower courts had either confined Gobitis to its facts or not en-
forced it and that newspapers throughout the nation condemned it.23 Fur-
ther, in 1942, Congress enacted a statute that, the American Civil Liber-
ties Union argued, preempted state regulation and did not require that the
flag be saluted.24
By opening up the canon to include texts not "already read," one learns
of the context in which the Supreme Court wrote; in Kolodny's terms,
that information enables the reader to be conscious of the difficulty of
distinguishing "as primary the importance of what we read as opposed to
how we have learned to read it."2 As a consequence, the reading of the
nature of the question for the Supreme Court in Barnette changes, as does
the interpretation of the work of the justices when writing their opinions.
Were I to choose to understand the genre of judicial opinions by analyzing
the flag salute cases, were I to retell that story, pass it on so as to give
value and meaning to it, I would want to include the other voices, the
voices of the lower courts, other participants, and those not "in court," as
well as the voices of the hierarchically superior court.26
Such inclusions lead to questions about some of the conclusions ad-
vanced by Robert Ferguson. First, given the absence of direct discussion in
the Barnette opinions of the trial court's deviation from the norm of fol-
lowing precedent,2 7 claims about the drama of the "monologic voice" seem
overstated. Second, the four categories offered to describe this genre, the
interrogative, monologic, and declarative tones and the rhetoric of inevita-
bility, 8 seem incomplete. One would also want to add a fifth aspect-how
22. Brief of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, of the American Bar Association, As Friends of
the Court, at 12-13, Barnette (No. 591).
23. Appellees' Brief at 79-80, Barnette (No. 591).
24. 36 U.S.C. § 172, Pub. L. 77-623, ch. 435, stated that "civilians will always show full respect
to the flag when the pledge is given by merely standing at attention, men removing the headdress."
See Brief for American Civil Liberties Union, Amicus Curiae, at 20-22, Barnette (No. 591). This
provision is mentioned by the majority in Barnette and described as a Congressional decision to make
"flag observance voluntary." 319 U.S. at 638 & n. 17.
25. Kolodny, "Dancing Through the Mind Field," 154 (emphasis in the original) (cited in note
14).
26. The refusal to look at and hence the silencing of the lower court judges is somewhat different
from the silencing of women that Tillie Olsen discusses in her book, Silences (New York: Delta/
Seymour Laurence, 1978). The lower court opinions are often published; Supreme Court records and
briefs are also readily available, so that, if one chooses, one can read several authors' telling of a
particular case. (See note 16, supra.) In contrast, in many settings the voices of women and minorities
have been literally silenced by the refusal to publish. Yet as Olsen and others remind us, although
marginalized, the voices have been and can be heard; the silence has not been complete.
27. Given that the lower court judges were willing to ignore Gobitis, Barnette does not seem as
much of a "hard case" as Robert Ferguson's description, and perhaps Frankfurter's dissent, suggest.
28. See Ferguson, "The Judicial Opinion," 204 (cited in note 3).
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Supreme Court opinions routinely recreate and/or distort the "facts" and
"law" that are the predicates of decisions. This "genre" includes recrea-
tion/distortion as surely as it includes inevitability.
Note that my comment is not an assertion that the Supreme Court
"lied" and the "truth" emerges by virtue of looking to the lower courts.
Rather, the argument is that there is no obvious reason to look only to the
Supreme Court opinion as the source of the story, or even as the authori-
tative statement of the problem to which the Supreme Court justices must
respond. To the contrary, one needs to look outside the opinion to read it.
To the extent one wants to understand the genre of "the judicial opin-
ions" of the United States Supreme Court, one needs to go beyond the
"paradigm" of rereading that court's opinions.29
In addition to informing the inquiry about the judicial opinion as legal/
literary genre, looking beyond those opinions reminds "us" not to focus
exclusively upon the judicial opinion to read the work of law. When one
looks at law as an activity of generating stories as well as of maintaining
and deploying power,30 there is more to decipher than the voices of the
Supreme Court. One issue to consider is the role of the hierarchy and how
its superior position is maintained. If the story of the flag salute cases is
told only from the point of view of the two United States Supreme Court
opinions, the idea of the Supreme Court as the central lawmaker is main-
tained. But, when the trial court opinion in Barnette is added, the hierar-
chy is not so powerful, so monolithic, so uncomplex as might have first
appeared.31 The addition of new voices raises complex questions-about
the relationship among speakers, the ownership of stories, appropriation
and control. With new voices come issues of which speakers have the
power of validation and why.32
Let me offer another example of the hierarchy's efforts to maintain it-
self and of choices that we, as the canon creators of law, have to
make-choices that either maintain or question that hierarchy. In the
United States federal and state courts, judges are traditionally described as
29. As Annette Kolodny explains, the "reader coming upon such fiction with knowledge of neither
its informing literary traditions nor its real-world contexts will find himself hard pressed, though he
may recognize the words on the page, to competently decipher its intended meanings." Kolodny,
"Dancing Through the Mind Field," 155 (cited in note 14).
30. See Robert M. Cover, "Violence and the Word," Yale Law Journal 95 (1986): 1601.
31. None of the Supreme Court justices writing in Barnette explores the import of what the three
judge court had done. Justice Jackson's only mention of the case below is the following description:
"The cause was submitted on the pleadings to a District Court of three judges. It restrained enforce-
ment as to the plaintiffs and those of that class." 319 U.S. at 630. To have "restrained enforcement"
would have to mean not applying Gobitis, but Jackson offers no comment on that lower court's action.
Arguably, Frankfurter's references to judicial obligations and duties could be understood as oblique
digs at the lower court judges. 319 U.S. at 647-48.
32. See Robert Stepto, From Behind the Veil: A Study of Afro-American Narrative (Urbana, Ill.:
University of Illinois Press, 1979) and Harriet Jacobs, Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl Written
by Herself, ed. Jean Fagan Yellin (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987) (the inclusion
of a preface by a white woman to "authenticate" the narrative evidences the power of whites to speak
for and to silence others).
[Vol. 2: 221
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"impartial," "disinterested," and "disengaged." An oft repeated phrase is
"no man can be a judge in his own cause." Translated into constitutional,
statutory and common law command, the rule is stated: a person cannot
be the judge in a specific case if he or she has a personal or financial stake
in that case.
In 1980, the United States Supreme Court sat on a case in which the
question was: Had Congress illegally cut the salaries of the justices and
judges of the federal courts? Recall that Article III of the United States
Constitution protects judicial salaries from congressional cuts by the "No
Diminution Clause."3 The case, called United States v. Will,3 had an
obvious problem: all federal judges and justices had an interest, a direct
financial stake, in the outcome of the case. However, the federal judiciary
heard the case. As Chief Justice Burger explained for the Court, neither
lower court judges nor Supreme Court justices were barred from partici-
pating because of what he called "the ancient Rule of Necessity. '"" The
rule, he said, was that, if under ordinary rules of disqualification all the
judges were disqualified, then "necessity" meant that they could all none-
theless sit and decide the case.
Note the assumption implicit in necessity: only the ones called "judges"
could sit in judgment. By inventing a rule of "necessity," a hierarchy (in
this instance, a patriarchal hierarchy) maintained its power. It sat in judg-
ment, despite its rules of disinterest. The federal judiciary continued to
judge, rather than be the subject of a judgment made by others.
But of course there is an alternative practice. At least seven states have
constitutional or statutory provisions to permit the creation of ad hoc
courts to sit when all the "regular" judges are disqualified. For example,
in 1925, the members of the Supreme Court of Texas were disqualified in
a case that involved a fraternal organization, the Woodmen of the World.
Apparently, many male judges and lawyers were members of the organi-
zation, an insurance company that grew out of Modern Woodmen of
America, founded in 1882.38 Given the conflict of interest, regular judges
did not sit. Instead, three women sat as "Special Associate Justices" and
briefly held the power of the Supreme Court of Texas. 37
33. U.S. Const. Art. III, § I states that the judges "shall . . . receive for their Services, a Com-
pensation which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office."
34. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980).
35. 449 U.S. at 212. On the merits, the Court held that some, but not all, of the salary decreases
were permissible. Ibid. at 229. See generally Judith Resnik, "On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations
of the Aspirations for our Judges," Southern California Law Review 61 (1988): 1878.
36. See A Brief History of Fraternalism and The Woodmen (pamphlet printed by the organiza-
tion, on file with the author).
37. Johnson v. Darr, 272 S.W. 1098 (Tex. 1925). Hortense Ward, Special Chief Justice, Hattie
L. Henenberg, and Ruth Virginia Brazzil, Special Associate Justices, sat on the case. According to a
contemporary report, the women took the oath of office but none "of the women raised her right
hand, as is customary among men taking an oath of office. They did not seem flurried by the experi-
ence." The Texas Law Student, 1 Apr. 1925, p. 3. For a reproduction of a photograph of that court,
see Resnik, "On the Bias," 1895 (cited in note 35).
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When ad hoc courts are created, regular judges not only give up their
position in a hierarchy for a moment, they also agree to be judged by
others. Thus, all are reminded (appropriately, in my view) that the judges
are us, that they are amongst us, not other than us. Such are the stories
that need to be reclaimed and retold. Reclaimed-literally, for tales of the
relinquishment of judicial power are often hard to find. Despite Robert
Ferguson's assertion that judges "explain every action with an individual
writing," 38 many courts do not have a tradition of documenting disqualifi-
cations or special appointments. Sometimes, a footnote might note
that-but not explain why-a special court has been convened. In the
federal system, the current custom is for judges not to provide an explana-
tion when they voluntarily recuse themselves, thereby insulating them-
selves from examination and limiting the information available about
when judges believe that recusal is appropriate. 9 Thus, with footnotes
and silence, the fact of power relinquishment is hidden, and the conversa-
tion about how much power is held, distorted.
III. SHIFTING THE Focus
We, who sit in the position of privilege, who help to construct the ca-
non, must also decide how much time we devote to the voices of the high-
est courts. The admonitions of Judge Patricia Wald, Chief Judge of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, are apt here. Judge Wald
joined a panel of law professors and judges to speak about the topic "judi-
cial review and constitutional limitations." Judge Wald said that she was
not at all sure that the raging constitutional debate about the proper limits
of constitutional analysis had much effect on the "behavior of ordinary
judges." ' As she put it, "constitutional cases for most federal judges are a
rarity, gourmet fare, definitely not the bread and butter of our everyday
worklives." ' 1 Judge Wald's comments go deeper than a claim of irrele-
vance. Her comment is that academics ignore the everyday experiences of
judges, the realities of judging, which lead judges to avoid constitutional
cases-with their potential battles of rehearing and Supreme Court
review.
Compare Patricia Wald's comments with those of Justice Antonin
38. Ferguson, "The Judicial Opinion," 202 (cited in note 3).
39. See John Leubsdorf, "Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification," New York University
Law Review 62 (1987): 237, 244. See also Tony Mauro, "Smoking Out the Ginsburg Story: How the
Reporters Got the Dope," Legal Times of Washington, 16 Nov. 1987, p. 15, col. 1 (reporter at-
tempted to see a recusal motion on file at the United States Supreme Court but was told that such a
motion "was not part of the public record .... The bottom line, then, is that under Court practice
the existence of a recusal motion . . . is unknowable by the public, unless a lawyer happens to men-
tion it.").
40. Patricia Wald, "Judicial Review and Constitutional Limitations," Golden Gate University
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Scalia, who sat on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and
is now a member of the United States Supreme Court. Scalia and Wald
share an essential insight: that the daily tasks of judging are at great dis-
tance from the academic conceptions of the activities. Justice Scalia
(speaking to the American Bar Foundation) complained about the drudg-
ery of the work of a federal judge, the processing of "many less significant
cases, many routine tort and employment disputes."4 Justice Scalia con-
trasted the everyday life of the judge with what he had learned in law
school. He said that, when in 1960 as a law student he hoped to be a
federal judge, he did not have the hope to dispose of "routine" and "trivial
cases."4 Both Scalia and Wald agree that the academic vision of judging
is at odds with the daily life of judges. Patricia Wald wants to change the
academic vision to fit the reality of judges' lives. Antonin Scalia wants to
change the work of judges to fit the conception that important people do
not do routine work.
IV. CONCLUSION
My hope is that, in the construction of the voices of judges, in the inter-
pretation of their distinctive tones, we look beyond supreme courts' opin-
ions to the lower courts and to the ordinary lives of judges. My hope is
that we give voice to, repeat, empower, and value the tasks of those other
than the justices and judges of the highest courts. Further, when we speak
of "the judicial voice," we need to speak of what judges say not only when
they sit on the bench but also when they wheel and deal in settlement
conferences, when they speak ex parte, on and off "the record," and when
they simply write "so ordered."
We need to look to these activities not only as an act of inclusion. We
need to look to these activities before we draw conclusions about "the judi-
cial voice" and how much judges actually are required to explain all of
their actions. For example, in the fall of 1989, a New York Times re-
porter described the actions of Judge Jack Weinstein, a federal trial judge
in Brooklyn, New York. After a civil trial under the Racketeering and
Corrupt Practices Act (RICO) against the Long Island Lighting and
Power Company (LILCO), a jury returned a verdict of 7.6 million dollars
42. Antonin Scalia, remarks before the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation and the National
Conference of Bar Presidents, 15 Feb. 1987, pp. 3, 5 (on file with the author). In the published
version of these comments, "An Address by Justice Antonin Scalia, United States Supreme Court,"
Federal Bar & News Journal 34 (July/Aug. 1987): 252, Justice Scalia commented that the federal
courts were not (in the 1960s) "the place where one would find many routine tort and employment
disputes" but that, by the 1980s, federal judges were dealing with "more and more cases of less and
less import." Ibid., 252.
43. Scalia, remarks, 2, 6 (cited in note 42). Professor Marc Galanter has responded to Justice
Scalia by analyzing the changes in federal court caseload since the 1960s. See Marc Galanter, "The
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to be awarded to Suffolk County. The loser, LILCO, asked the judge to
set aside the verdict." Instead of writing an opinion, instead of acting as
"compelled," Judge Weinstein tried to settle the lawsuits against LILCO.
The reporter described Weinstein's actions this way: "For almost seven
hours yesterday a federal judge alternately lectured to and debated with
more than 30 lawyers in an apparent effort to force a resolution. . .. "',
Here, Judge Weinstein's voice does not appear declarative or monolithic.
Instead, it could be described as posturing, argumentative, cajoling, or
threatening.
Inclusion of texts other than the United States Supreme Court opinions
is critical to the shape of the judgments we make about "the judicial opin-
ion" and "the judicial voice." Jack Weinstein also has the name "judge,"
but his voice is, at least sometimes, quite different from what Robert Fer-
guson describes. And, when one listens to appellate judges and justices, in
both oral and written work, one also finds argument and posturing,4 6 rec-
reation and distortion.
My hope is that, as "we" tell law stories, we tell not only stories from
the vantage point of the privileged decision maker, the Supreme Court
justice, the statute or constitutional writer, but from the vantage points of
the other participants. My hope is that we will celebrate, privilege, and
give value to the daily tasks of those who do not sit at the top of the
hierarchy. When we tell the story of the flag salute cases, we must include
not only the "paradigm, already read" but also the voices, the opinion, the
text of Judges Parker, Watkins, and Moore.
44. County of Suffolk v. LILCO, No. CV 87-646 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1988) (Westlaw, 1988 WL
150700, digest of jury verdict proceeding).
45. New York Times, 2 Feb. 1989, sec. B, p. 1, col. 1.
46. See, e.g., the exchanges between Justices Powell and Stevens in Pennhurst State School and
Hospitals v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), in which Justice Powell describes Stevens' dissent as
"out of touch with reality" (at 107) and Justice Stevens counters by asserting that the majority's
reasoning leads to a "perverse result" (at 127), and between Justices Scalia and O'Connor in Webster
v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989), in which Justice Scalia describes
O'Connor's opinion as "irrational" (at 3067), while she calls for "restraint" (at 3061).
[Vol. 2: 221
10
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 16
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol2/iss1/16
